

Message Text

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ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 NEAE-00 SSM-05 OMB-01

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05

PA-02 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-15 TRSE-00 DHA-02 ORM-02

AID-05 ACDA-10 EB-07 COME-00 MCT-01 /125 W

----- 111786

P R 031612Z DEC 76

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7630

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

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GENEVA FOR MEPC DEL

E.O.11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR IS XF

SUBJ: RABIN INTERVIEW

1. MASS-CIRCULATION FRANCE SOIR OF DEC 3 CARRIES THE FIRST INSTALLMENT OF AN EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW WITH ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER RABIN BY PAUL WINKLER. A RESUME OF RABIN'S REPLIES TO WINKLER'S QUESTIONS FOLLOWS.

2. IN 1977, NEW ATTEMPTS WILL BE MADE TO DETERMINE THE DEGREE TO WHICH IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO TAKE THE SHARP TURN FROM WAR TO PEACE. ONE WAY WOULD BE RECONVENING THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, WHICH SHOULD HAVE THE SAME UNCLASSIFIED

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PARTICIPANTS AS LAST TIME. WE ARE OPPOSED TO PLO

PARTICIPATION, BUT ARE READY TO PARTICIPATE UNDER THE SAME CONDITIONS AS BEFORE.

3. THERE ARE THREE MAIN PROBLEMS. FIRST, THE DEFINITION OF "PEACE". FOR US IT MEANS ESTABLISHING PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN NEIGHBORS WITH BORDERS OPEN TO PEOPLE AND GOODS. SECOND, THE DEFINITION OF PEACEFUL BORDERS. THE ARABS WANT US TO WITHDRAW TO THE LINES EXISTING PRIOR TO THE SIX DAYS WAR. WE ARE PREPARED FOR TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS BUT IN NO CASE TO RETURN TO THOSE LINES. THIRD, THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION, THE DIFFERENCE OF VIEW BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARABS IS BECOMING GREATER. WITHOUT SETTling THESE PROBLEMS, ANY ATTEMPT TO FIND A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IS BOUND TO FAIL.

4. AFTER THE ISRAELI PULL-BACK IN THE GOLAN, WE WONDERED ABOUT SEEKING A GENERAL SETTLEMENT. BUT AFTER PRELIMINARY EXPLORATIONS, THROUGH AMERICAN GOOD OFFICES, WE DISCOVERED THAT OUR POINTS OF VIEW ON THE THREE BASIC QUESTIONS HAD NOT GOTTEN CLOSER, WORSE, THE DIFFERENCES WERE DEEPER ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION.

5. I THEN WENT TO THE US IN SEPTEMBER 1974 AND AFTER DISCUSSIONS, CONCLUDED THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO SEEK ANOTHER PARTIAL ACCORD. THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE LONG. WE HAD A BITTER MOMENT WHEN THE AMERICANS REVISED THEIR ESTIMATE AND THE EGYPTIANS CHANGED THEIR ATTITUDE. FINALLY IN SEPT 1975, WE ARRIVED AT A CONSENSUS ON A PARTIAL AGREEMENT. THE SINAI ACCORD FILLED ITS ROLE. IT WAS A STEP TOWARDS PEACE AND LED EGYPT TO CHANGE ITS NATIONAL PRIORITIES FROM REARMAMENT TO RECONSTRUCTION. SECOND, IT REDUCED SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE REGION. THIRD, IT CAUSED A DEBATE BETWEEN EGYPT AND THE OTHER ARABS ABOUT WHETHER A POLITICAL OR MILITARY POLICY LINE SHOULD BE FOLLOWED; WITHOUT THIS PRELIMINARY DEBATE, ANY HOPE OF SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS WAS FUTILE. FOURTH, THE ACCORD WAS AN IMPORTANT STEP IN US-ISRAELI

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COOPERATION; IT ALLOWED US TO STRENGTHEN OUR MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND TO IMPROVE OUR POLITICAL POSTURE IN THE US, AND LED THE AMERICANS TO UNDERSTAND US BETTER. AND OUR POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE ARABS IS BETTER, GIVEN WHAT WE CAN EXPECT NEXT YEAR.

6. THE AIM OF THE PARTIAL AGREEMENT WAS NOT TO PRODUCE IMMEDIATE NEW INITIATIVES BUT TO PROVIDE A PERIOD FOR

EXPLORING A WIDER AGREEMENT WITHOUT TIME PRESSURES ON
EITHER SIDE. IT WAS MEANT TO GIVE A RESPITE OF

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

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SEVERAL YEARS, NOT MONTHS. THAT GIVES US TIME TO
DECIDE, WITHOUT HASTE, WHAT WE HAVE TO DO TO HAVE A
GENUINE PEACE AGREEMENT. THAT DOESN'T MEAN DRAGGING
OUT THINGS, BUT DOING THEM PROPERLY. THE PROBLEM AND
THE CONFLICT ARE VERY COMPLEX.

7. AFTER THE SINAI ACCORD, THERE WERE TWO OPTIONS.
ONE, TO GO TO GENEVA WITH THE INTENTION OF
CONCLUDING A GENERAL AGREEMENT, BUT NOT IMPLYING THAT
THE PARTIES MUST NECESSARILY FIND THE BASIS FOR AN

ACCORD. THE OTHER, TO SIGN ANOTHER LIMITED BUT FAR-REACHING AGREEMENT. SUCH AN ACCORD WOULD BY PREFERENCE BE SIGNED WITH EGYPT, SYRIA AND JORDAN. THE END OF THE STATE OF WAR WOULD BE THE POINT TO DISCUSS IN THE NEXT
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PARTIAL AGREEMENT, NOT THE MODALITIES, BUT THE EFFECTIVE END OF THE STATE OF WAR. TODAY WE HAVE A CEASE FIRE BY WHICH EGYPT AND ISRAEL HAVE PROMISED NOT TO USE FORCE. THE END OF THE STATE OF WAR SIGNIFIES LEGALLY THAT THE STATE OF WAR DOES NOT EXIST BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ARAB SIGNATORIES. THUS BOYCOTT AND OTHER MEASURES WHICH DEPEND ON THE EXISTENCE OF A STATE OF WAR WOULD HAVE TO BE CHANGED. THERE WOULD BE NO COLD WAR.

8. WHAT IS MOST IMPORTANT IS THAT THERE BE NO STATE OF WAR WITH ITS LEGAL CONSEQUENCES. THEN CERTAIN PRACTICAL DISPOSITIONS WOULD NEED TO BE INCLUDED, SUCH AS PROVISION FOR PLANES TO FLY FROM CAIRO TO JERUSALEM. SUCH DETAILED, PRACTICAL AGREEMENTS ARE VERY IMPORTANT.

9. WE WILL NOT SIT DOWN WITH THE TERRORISTS OF THE PLO WHOSE PHILOSOPHY IS "DESTROY ISREAL". I RECOGNIZE THAT THERE IS A PALESTINIAN QUESTION BUT IT IS NOT THE HEART OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. ITS ESSENCE IS THE ARAB LEADERS' REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THE LEGITIMACY OF THE EXISTENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT, VIABLE JEWISH STATE. WHEN THEY ACCEPT THIS, ALL PROBLEMS CAN BE RESOLVED. WHEN EGYPT, SYRIA AND JORDAN ARE READY TO ACCEPT THIS, IT WILL BE A BREAK-THROUGH TOWARDS PEACE. ONCE THAT IS OBTAINED, THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM CAN BE RESOLVED. WHEN THE ARABS REALLY ADMIT THE PRESENCE OF ISRAEL THEY WILL HAVE TO ANNOUNCE IT TO THEIR PEOPLE AND THAT IS THE REAL BREAK-THROUGH. ISRAEL OUGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. IT MUST BE RESOLVED TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE POPULATIONS AND TERRITORIES EAST OF THE JORDAN. IN OTHER WORDS, IN THE ORIGINAL PALESTINE, ON BOTH SIDES OF THE JORDAN, THERE SHOULD BE BUT TWO STATES: ISRAEL AND, TO THE EAST, A JORDANO-PALESTINIAN STATE IN WHICH THE PALESTINIANS WILL FIND THE EXPRESSION OF THEIR IDENTITY.

10. THAT IS OUR POSITION. THERE IS NO REASON TO CREATE A THIRD STATE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN. IT
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WOULD BE A TIME BOMB WHICH WOULD DESTROY ANY
AGREEMENT OR ANY SOLUTION ENTERED INTO. WE ARE
CONVINCED THAT THE INTERLOCUTOR WITH WHOM WE SHOULD
NEGOTIATE IS THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT. WE WOULD NOT
OPPOSE ITS INCLUDING WEST BANKERS IN ITS DELEGATION.
NO AGREEMENT COULD BE CONCLUDED WITHOUT THE
JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT. IF THAT IS NOT POSSIBLE, WE
SHALL NEGOTIATE WITH SYRIA AND EGYPT.
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